War in the Tigray has killed 500,000 people and displaced over two million; now “peace” seems possible but how about that “Dam” Ethiopia-Egypt issue?
November 7, 2022
Those of us outside Africa have had much to focus on lately, from Ukraine to South and North Korea, inflation, climate change, pandemics, nuclear threats, and the US midterm elections. What has been lost from our Western headlines and news coverage —but not for those concerned—is the complex relations in the Horn of Africa as people and countries vie for space and recognition.
You could call it the three Es and a T: specifically Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and the Tigray Region.
The warring parties: Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tigray
Ethiopian President Abiy Ahmed received the Nobel Peace in 2019 for bringing an end to the 20-year stalemate with Eritrea. At that point, he was a virtual star in the West, but that quickly faded over the course of the next two years with the devastating war with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray Region, one in which he was joined by Eritrea in fighting the TPLF.
The extent of hostilities in Tigray and to some extent outside that region had a major negative impact on the people with over two million people displaced and possibly 500,000 or more killed – by some estimates, up to 800,000 were killed.
The war has also resulted in the loss of social cohesion, infrastructure, and economic activity. Civil strife like this means political wounds are deep and will be hard to quickly heal.
That said, for the first time, there are real prospects to start the healing process. After 10 days of peace talks, and successful negotiations in South Africa, an agreement was reachedbetween Ethiopia and the TPLF to what is called “a permanent cessation of hostilities”.
This step could lead in the future to a more comprehensive pact and ultimately the end of the conflict.
While the agreement is not yet publicly available, it has been described by the press as follows:
African Union envoy Olusegun Obasanjo, in the first briefing on the peace talks in South Africa, said Ethiopia’s government and Tigray authorities have agreed on “orderly, smooth and coordinated disarmament.” Other key points included “restoration of law and order,” he said, as well as “restoration of services” and “unhindered access to humanitarian supplies.”
This is promising except for one fact: One of the Es, Eritrea, was not a signatory to the agreement. Even though Eritrea has now improved its relations with Ethiopia and fought to contain the Tigray resistance, nonetheless it was not part of the peace talks and it is not clear what its government will do.
Further, representatives from Ethiopia’s Amhara region were also not a signatory, and it has had a long history of border disputes with Tigray.
One must hope not only that relative peace holds and the two parties adhere to the agreement terms, but equally if not most importantly, that the Eritreans will sign on to it.
If this proves to be the case, Western partners providing the needed humanitarian supplies and development aid will need to support continuing improved relations between the erstwhile warring parties, with external assistance and encouragement.
Future economic development in the Horn of Africa is facing a special geopolitical challenge: The Nile river that flows from south to north, tying the two Es, Egypt and Ethiopia, which inevitably involves the third E, Eritrea–and Sudan- in any development plan.
The “Dam” question: Ethiopia-Egypt Nile Problem
Both countries see their future as tied to the Nile River with Ethiopia seeking massive new power generation from its Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) as the means to propel its economic growth.
Egypt’s economy, agriculture, civilian populations, culture, and history, make it virtually impossible to separate from this river.
For decades, Egypt and another major affected country, Sudan, have disagreed with Ethiopia on the need for a legally binding agreement on the operation of the dam – Ethiopia says any pact should only be advisory.
The crux of the problem today is what happens next with this disputed dam, the largest hydroelectric project in Africa, with a cost of more than four billion dollars (some say five billion).
Much to the dismay of its neighbors, in August 2022 Ethiopia had completed the third GERD filling unilaterally, steps not yet taken in March 2022 when this was the subject of an Impakter article.
To Egyptian leaders, reductions in the flow of the Nile River is equivalent to undermining national security and survival.
On November 2, 2022, Egypt President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi said at the Arab Summit in Algeria put it this way:
“Egypt’s water resources have become unable to meet the needs of its population despite following a policy to rationalize consumption, through the frequent reuse of agricultural irrigation water that made the overall efficiency rate of its use in Egypt one of the highest rates in Africa.” (bolding added)
And further,
“Climate change has become a reality imposed on the world, and the dilemma of water security portends dire consequences if ignored, he said, stressing the need to preserve common Arab unity to face challenges.”
To be noted in this connection: The Egyptian President’s statement appears to overlook a critical element of the food insecurity situation in Egypt, namely its heavy dependence on grain imports from Ukraine and Russia and makes no mention of it.
The current Arab League meetings, as a result of its side and informal discussions, make it difficult to gauge whether behind the scenes there is important progress being made by the parties with help from outsiders.
One can hope such is the case, given the consequences if no solutions is found.
The Horn of Africa Needs Watching
International attention today is mainly on Ukraine, to a lesser degree on the Far East, Middle East, and elsewhere, as well as elections in many places.
While all of the above are important, we cannot lose sight of the fact that this region is significant and essential to global stability, climate change, economic growth, and pandemic containment.
The Horn of Africa is sort of the “door” to the continent. In the countries mentioned as well as in Djibouti, both Russia’s and the People’s Republic of China’s presence and influence have been rapidly rising. And, this is the case in other corners of Africa, such as in francophone countries in West Africa where since February 2022 France announced the withdrawal of its troops from Mali.
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Is this a time for the West to step back from its presence in Africa? Better hope not.
This article was originally published on IMPAKTER. Read the original article.
