Quebec’s new rule giving French precedence in legal interpretation breaks with Canada’s century-old bilingual framework.
by Karine McLaren. Originally published on Policy Options
April 29, 2025
(Version française disponible ici.)
Quebec has adopted a robust legal framework to affirm French as its official language — a legitimate and historically grounded linguistic project. However, the addition of Section 7.1 to the Charter of the French Language, as part of Bill 96, introduces a provision that has gone largely unnoticed in public debate, despite raising significant legal concerns: in the event of a discrepancy between the French and English versions of a law, the French text now prevails.
At first glance, this measure appears consistent with the broader goal of promoting the French language. Yet it goes much further: it undermines more than a century of Canadian law governing bilingual statutory interpretation, which has long rested on the principle of equal authority of official versions. In doing so, it raises fundamental issues concerning interpretation, linguistic equality, and constitutional compliance.
The principle of legal authority is a Constitutional foundation
Legislative bilingualism in Quebec is guaranteed by Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867, which requires laws to be enacted and published in both French and English. This is not merely a symbolic recognition of Canada’s two official languages: it means that both versions of a statute carry the same legal weight, and that interpretation must treat them equally.
This principle, known as the “equal authority rule,” was first articulated by the Supreme Court of Canada in 1891. In CPR v. Robinson, Justice Henri-Elzéar Taschereau emphasized that both language versions of a statute hold equal value and must not be read in isolation. This bilingual reading method has since been reaffirmed many times.
This cross-reading approach lies at the heart of Canada’s legislative bilingualism. It is grounded in the principle that both official versions of a statute together constitute the full and equivalent expression of the legal norm. Neither version is derived from the other: each carries its own authority, and statutory interpretation must consider their interaction.
My experience as a francophone researcher from a common law province—where French is a minority language—does not lead me to favour one language over the other. Rather, it leads me to affirm, consistently, that legislative bilingualism can only be genuine if it is equal, regardless of which language dominates in a given context.
This requirement of equality was reaffirmed notably in Doré v. Verdun (1997), where the court stated that both versions of Quebec legislation subject to Section 133 carry equal legal force and must be read together to determine their true meaning.
The return of a contested principle
It is precisely this principle of equality that is challenged by Section 7.1 of the Charter, in which the rupture is made explicit:
“In the case of a discrepancy between the French and English versions of a statute, regulation or other act […] that cannot be properly resolved using the ordinary rules of interpretation, the French text shall prevail.”
This type of provision is not without precedent. In 1977, Section 9 of the Charter of the French Language granted exclusive official status to the French version of Quebec’s statutes and regulations. The Supreme Court declared the provision unconstitutional in Quebec v. Blaikie (1979), on the grounds that it violated Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867 by denying the English version any legal force.
In response, the Quebec legislature amended the Interpretation Act to introduce a rule giving French precedence in cases of divergence. Although less radical, that rule was also repealed in 1993, following academic criticism highlighting its incompatibility with Section 133 of the Constitution Act, 1867.
By reintroducing a rule of linguistic precedence—even a conditional one—Section 7.1 reopens a debate many had thought settled. It departs not only from case law but from the long-standing fundamental principles that govern the interpretation of laws drafted in both official languages.
An interpretive qualifier that fails to reassure
Supporters of Section 7.1 might argue that French is given priority only as a last resort, when “the ordinary rules of interpretation” fail. Yet this qualifier is far from reassuring.
First, the “ordinary rules of interpretation” are not defined in the Charter. Even if one assumes they refer to the modern principle of interpretation—which requires reading legislative provisions in their broader context, in light of the statute’s purpose and legislative intent—this reference does not resolve the issue: granting automatic priority to one version in such cases remains incompatible with the constitutional principle of equal authority.
Second, the criterion of “proper” resolution is deeply vague: does it refer to a mere disagreement between interpreters? To a lingering doubt? To uncertainty with a comparative reading? This lack of clarity opens the door to a subjective assessment of whether a divergence is “resolvable,” thereby weakening the obligation to compare both versions.
A court could too readily conclude that comparative interpretation has failed as soon as an ambiguity persists—even after a partial review. The French version would then prevail by default, without the rigorous and contextual analysis required under Canadian law. Such a mechanism risks turning the qualifying clause into a tool of automatic linguistic priority, draining the principle of equal authority of its substance.
Thus, even if contextual analysis may at times lead the interpreter to favour one version over the other, that judgment must always rest on a rigorous interpretive process—not on a predetermined linguistic preference. Determining which version better reflects the legislator’s intent is rarely self-evident: it is a nuanced assessment that cannot depend on a default language preference, even when framed as conditional.
Tangible consequences for access to law
This rule of linguistic priority carries very real legal consequences. On the one hand, it may lead a court to dismiss a coherent interpretation solely because it appears in the English version. On the other hand, it undermines anglophone litigants’ access to the legal norm: even if they consult a statute in their own language, that version could be set aside—not following a full comparative analysis, but by virtue of an automatic linguistic priority established by law.
This dynamic weakens the legal recognition of the English version as a normative source and undermines confidence in the equality of both languages in determining the applicable law.
Such a mechanism creates a legal vulnerability that undermines the goal of equal access to the law. By subordinating one version, Section 7.1 undermines the substantive equality that must exist between official languages: if one can prevail by default, equality becomes illusory.
These issues point to a broader concern: by reinstating a linguistic hierarchy, Section 7.1 threatens the very stability of legislative bilingualism. It weakens an interpretive framework that has, for over a century, rested on the idea that two languages can express a single legal norm equally
Tension with the modern principle of interpretation
Section 7.1 is also difficult to reconcile with the “modern principle” of interpretation, recognized and consistently applied by the Supreme Court of Canada. This principle relies on reading statutory language in light of its text, context, purpose, and legislative intent. It applies to all statutes, including bilingual legislation.
As professor Ruth Sullivan, a leading expert on statutory interpretation in Canada, has written:
“The most important implication of the equal authenticity rule is that neither version can be assigned paramountcy over the other. Any rule of interpretation that purports to resolve conflicts between the French and English versions of statutes by giving priority to one of the language versions is inconsistent with this rule.”
Within this framework, assigning default priority to French—even in cases of interpretive difficulty—amounts to bypassing the comparative analysis that forms the very foundation of the Canadian method of interpretation.
A reform to reconsider for the sake of legislative bilingualism
Section 7.1 enshrines a linguistic hierarchy that breaks with the equal authority of official versions. By subordinating one to the other, it weakens a fundamental rule of interpretation on which the entire Canadian legal order rests—including in Quebec: the rule of coherent, stable, and accessible bilingual interpretation.
This rule is an institutional safeguard against arbitrariness, a guarantee of legal certainty, and a cornerstone of equality before the law, regardless of the language in which citizens access the statute. In this sense, Section 7.1 goes beyond a mere methodological departure: it directly contravenes the constitutional requirements of Section 133, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada.
This provision should be reconsidered—not in the name of one language or the other, but in the name of legislative interpretation itself, which must remain faithful to the principle of equal authority. True linguistic equality cannot be reduced to a matter of formal appearance: it requires that both versions of a statute be recognized as equally authoritative, both in interpretation and in application.
An informed public debate on this issue is essential if we are to preserve the integrity of legislative bilingualism within Canada’s constitutional framework—including in Quebec, where this framework fully applies. What is at stake is not only constitutional compliance, but also public confidence in the accessibility and stability of the law.
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This article first appeared on Policy Options and is republished here under a Creative Commons license.